Abstract

This chapter has four main points. First, I argue that the human rightsHuman rights approach to public health ethicsEthics, championed by Jonathan MannMann, Jonathan and others, needs to engage with philosophical accounts of moral human rights. Second, I argue that, while both interest-based and agencyAgency accounts of moralRightshumanhuman rightsHuman rights are defensible as philosophical accounts of human rights, and both have advantages as the foundation for a human rights approach toRightshealth public health ethics, the interest-based approach is a natural fit for this approach. Third, I illustrate how engagement with the philosophical accounts of the structure of moral rights can help respond to the criticism that certain rights underpinning the human rightsHuman rights approach to public health ethics, such as the right to health, cannot be justified. Finally, I argue that the human rights approach to public health ethics promises to contribute to our understanding of both health and human rightsHuman rights.