Wirtschaft und Kausalität. Brexit, Fake-News und Postfaktizität: Welche Rolle spielen überhaupt noch Ursache-Wirkungs-Beziehungen?

WiSt 4:46–48. (2019)
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Abstract

The economic sciences want to explain economical phenomena scientifically, which presupposes a causality concept. But the distinction between causes and reasons makes causal approaches problematic. While it is true that the question of the naturalizability of causal arguments is undecided, the significance of causal explanations of economic phenomena remains unaffected.

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Kay Herrmann
Chemnitz University of Technology

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