Simply Irresistible: Addiction, Responsibility, and Irresistible Desires

Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):196-216 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper I set out to investigate the claim that addicts lack su cient control over their drug-taking and are thus not morally responsible for it. More speci cally, I evaluate what I call the Simply Irresistible Argument, which proceeds from the claim that addictive desires are irresistible to the conclusion that addicts are not responsible for acting on such desires. I rst propose that we have to disambiguate the notion of an irresistible desire according to temporal criteria, and revise the original argument accordingly in two di erent ways; one involving proximally irresistible desires and one involving permanently irresistible desires. I propose that both versions of the Simply Irresistible Argument fail, and, as a result, that considerations about irresistible desires and control cannot extricate addicts from responsibility for their drug-taking.

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Citations of this work

Understanding Addiction.Robert M. Kelly - 2021 - Dissertation, University at Buffalo

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References found in this work

Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. Oxford University Press UK.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Control, responsibility, and moral assessment.Angela M. Smith - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.

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