'There's something it's like' and the structure of consciousness

Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63 (2007)
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Abstract

I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: e is some way as regards its subject; e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; e is some way in the awareness of its subject; e's subject is the "experiencer" of e. I provide additional argumentation for the view in this paper that in the context, 'like this' functions as a predicate variable

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Benj Hellie
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

Degrees of Consciousness.Andrew Y. Lee - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):553-575.
Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 136-160.
Knowing what things look like.Matthew McGrath - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):1-41.
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - 2019 - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 75–94.

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References found in this work

Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
The Frege reader.Gottlob Frege & Michael Beaney (eds.) - 1997 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
The thought: A logical inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. pp. 29--57.

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