Big Data and Compounding Injustice

Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):62-83 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article argues that the fact that an action will compound a prior injustice counts as a reason against doing the action. I call this reason The Anti-Compounding Injustice principle or aci. Compounding injustice and the aci principle are likely to be relevant when analyzing the moral issues raised by “big data” and its combination with the computational power of machine learning and artificial intelligence. Past injustice can infect the data used in algorithmic decisions in two distinct ways. Sometimes prior injustice undermines the accuracy of the data itself. In these contexts, improving accuracy will also help to avoid compounding injustice. Other times, past injustice produces real-world differences among people with regard to skills, health, wealth, and other traits that employers, lenders, and others seek to measure. When decisions are based on accurate data that itself results from prior injustice, these decisions can also compound injustice. This second dynamic has received less attention than the first but is especially important because improving the accuracy of data will not mitigate this unfairness.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,846

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Contracts and computers.Damon Mackett - 2022 - South African Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):386-400.
Justice in waiting: The harms and wrongs of temporary refugee protection.Rebecca Buxton - 2023 - European Journal of Political Theory 22 (1):51-72.
Structural Injustice and Ethical Consumption.Mark Peacock - 2023 - The Journal of Ethics 27 (2):191-210.
Neither justice nor charity? Kant on ‘general injustice’.Kate A. Moran - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):477-498.
On Living in an Unjust Society.David Brooks - 1989 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (1):31-42.
Starting from Injustice.Naomi Zack - 2017 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 24:79-95.
Moral Emotions and Unnamed Wrongs: Revisiting Epistemic Injustice.Usha Nathan - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (29).
The Persistence of Injustice.Joe Pettit - 2005 - Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 25 (1):197-218.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-21

Downloads
30 (#532,397)

6 months
22 (#122,745)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references