Summary

Analysis 77 (3):569-571 (2017)
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Abstract

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] without Persons is a defence of a time-slice-centric conception of rationality, on which the locus of rationality, to speak metaphorically, is the time-slice rather than the temporally extended person. On this view, the relationship between two time-slices of a single agent is not different in kind, as far as rational evaluation is concerned, from the relationship between two distinct agents. How you are, or how you believe you are, at other times plays no special role in determining what rationality requires of you right now.I am not the first to defend or discuss this kind of view. The book’s title is an allusion to Parfit’s famous Reasons and Persons, where he defends theses about rationality...

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Brian Hedden
Australian National University

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