Rationality, Judgment, and Argument Assessment

Informal Logic 16 (1) (1994)
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Abstract

In contrast to approaches to critical thinking which emphasize the importance of rules, strategies and criteria for the analysis and evaluation of arguments, this paper seeks to vindicate the central role which judgment plays in the assessment process. To counteract charges of arbitrariness or subjectivism in the exercise of judgment, individual and intersubjective constraints are outlined which can ensure its reliable exercise. The contextuality of argumentation, as it affects judgment, is discussed, and some conclusions are drawn about how acknowledgment of the role of judgment in argumentation can influence our conception of the reasoning process

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References found in this work

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.David Bohm - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (57):377-379.
A practical study of argument.Trudy Govier - 1991 - Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co..
Skeptical rationalism.William Berkson - 1979 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4):281 – 320.
Skeptical Rationalism.William Berkson - 1987 - In Joseph Agassi & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Rationality: the critical view. Hingham, MA, USA: Distributors for the U.S. and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 21--43.

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