On first-person authority

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):1-19 (2002)
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Abstract

How are we to explain the authority we have in pronouncing on our own thoughts? A 'constitutive' theory, on which a second-level belief may help to constitute the first-level state it is about, has considerable advantages, for example in relieving pressures towards dualism. The paper aims to exploit an analogy between authority in performative utterances and authority on the psychological to get a clearer view of how such a constitutive account might work and its metaphysical presuppositions

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10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00040.x

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Jane Heal
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

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