Consent and Behavioral Public Policies: A Social Choice Perspective

Res Publica 29 (1):141-163 (2022)
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Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which behavioral public policies can be both efficient and democratic by reflecting on the conditions under which individuals could rationally consent to them. Consent refers to a moral requirement that a behavioral public policy should respect what I call a person’s value autonomy and conception of the good. Behavioral public policies can take many forms. Based on a social choice framework, I argue that fully paternalistic and prudential behavioral public policies are unlikely to trigger a hypothetical form of rational consent. Non-fully paternalistic behavioral public policies with partially non-prudential motivations are less problematic in this perspective. In any case, a public deliberative stage preceding the implementation of policies seems to be the best democratic way to justify them.

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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Kantian constructivism in moral theory.John Rawls - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (9):515-572.
Paternalism.Gerald Dworkin - 1972 - The Monist 56 (1):64-84.

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