In connection with a much discussed hypothetical situation, in which a person can prevent the death (or killing) of several innocent people only if she herself kills an innocent person, some have maintained that it is morally better for her not to kill that innocent person, on the ground that it is morally worse to do harm than to allow it. The distinc

Utilitas 14 (1) (2002)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,654

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Equating innocent threats and bystanders.Helen Frowe - 2008 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):277-290.
The basis of moral liability to defensive killing.Jeff McMahan - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):386–405.
A practical account of self-defence.Helen Frowe - 2010 - Law and Philosophy 29 (3):245-272.
Dividing Harm.Gerhard Øverland - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (4):547-566.
The Moral Status of Nonresponsible Threats.Jason Hanna - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (1):19-32.
Pacifism and Moral Theory.Jeff McMahan - 2010 - Diametros 23:44-68.
The Human Body Sword.Kris Borer - 2010 - Libertarian Papers 2:20.
Abortion and the argument from innocence.Marvin Kohl - 1971 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 14 (1-4):147-151.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-03-21

Downloads
29 (#562,373)

6 months
2 (#1,236,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references