Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance

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Philosophical Studies 178 (2):515-532 (2020)
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Abstract

Ginger Schultheis offers a novel and interesting argument against epistemic permissivism. While we think that her argument is ultimately uncompelling, we think its faults are instructive. We explore the relationship between epistemic permissivism, Margin-for-Error principles, and an epistemological version of Dominance reasoning.

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2021

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10.1007/s11098-020-01443-w

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Author Profiles

John Hawthorne
Australian Catholic University
Yoaav Isaacs
Baylor University

Citations of this work

Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.
Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

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