How (not) to specify normal conditions for response-dependent concepts

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):325 – 331 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The extensions of response-dependent concepts are a priori connected with the subjective responses that competent users of that concept have in normal conditions. There are two strategies for specifying normal conditions for response-dependent concepts: topic-specific and topic-neutral. On a topic-specific specification, a characterization of normal conditions would be given separately for each response-dependent concept (or a non-trivial subset of response-dependent concepts, such as our colour concepts), whereas a topic-neutral specification would be given in a uniform way for all response-dependent concepts. In this paper I argue, using a thought experiment, that only topic-neutral specifications will deliver the a priori knowledge constitutive of response-dependence.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,100

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Response Dependent Concepts.P. Menzies (ed.) - 1991 - ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 1.
Acceptance-dependence: A social kind of response-dependence.Frank A. Hindriks - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):481–498.
A modest solution to the problem of rule-following.Frank A. Hindriks - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):65-98.
A theory of normal and ideal conditions.Philip Pettit - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 96 (1):21-44.
Against moral response-dependence.Nick Zangwill - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):285 - 290.
Response-Dependence.Christine Tappolet & Roberto Casati - 1998 - European Review of Philosophy 3:227.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
107 (#164,847)

6 months
12 (#216,527)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jussi Haukioja
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Dispositional Theories of Value.Michael Smith, David Lewis & Mark Johnston - 1989 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 63 (1):89-174.

View all 20 references / Add more references