Abstract

This dissertation is designed to determine the conditions that must be met to properly convict an accused of an attempted crime. In Part I, a detailed examination is made of the mens rea required for attempt. It is shown that the specific intent required consists of two distinct instances of ordinary criminal intention. In Part II, the problem of the actus reus of attempt is examined within the context of the problem of when an accused can be convicted for attempting to do what is impossible. This is because this problem has commanded extensive attention in the literature and its solution requires the specification of the actus reus of attempt. A survey is made of the two main approaches to the problem of impossible attempts, the subjectivist and objectivist, and a critical evaluation is made of each. ;In Part III, the problem of the actus reus is resolved as well as the two remaining mens reus problems. The claim is made that previous efforts to resolve these issues have failed because they have treated a problem of criminal responsibility as though it was a problem of moral responsibility. Morality consists of the regulation of human behavior according to general, impersonal rules. Criminal law consists of the regulation of human behavior according to rules devised and administered by human beings. The need to consider the actions of the legal administrators is what has been overlooked in previous discussions. ;Careful consideration of this fact together with an investigation of both the history and philosophical rationale underlying Anglo-American criminal law lead to the rejection of the subjectivist approach. Further, this dictates a set of three necessary conditions that indicate that the actus reus of attempt must consist of an action that threatens the harm of the completed crime and is sufficient to generate public alarm. Finally, these same considerations show that the specific intent required must consist in the desire for or knowledge of both the consequences and attendant circumstances of the completed crime and that, in this context, knowledge consists of a justified belief