Why Insights in Evolutionary Moral Psychology Help Resolve Long-Standing Meta-Ethical Questions

Abstract

In this brief paper, I present some basic arguments for why insights in moral psychology, especially the work of Jonathan Haidt and others in Moral Foundations Theory, points towards a resolution of long-standing meta-ethical questions.

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