The Role of Consciousness in Locke's Theory of Mind: Problems and Consequences

Dissertation, City University of New York (2002)
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Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine Locke's theory of mind and the role consciousness plays therein. It is Locke's belief that consciousness is a necessary condition of all mental phenomena, of everything we experience, and that the notion of an unconscious mental state or experience is absurd. Consequently, we find that all of what Locke says the mind is capable of knowing and doing starts and stops in consciousness. ;It will be my contention that Locke's theory of consciousness is problematic not only because of the inconsistent ways in which he explains how consciousness informs our theories of the world and functions in both sensation and reflection, the two sources from which he says all of the mind's contents are derived, but also because, as we will see, there is no way to provide a successful theory of mind without including the unconscious. That is, what I will argue is that it is not simply because Locke is careless in formulating his empiricist theory of mind and his belief about the role consciousness plays therein that it must be rejected, but because it is impossible to provide a theory of mind without somehow accounting for unconscious mental states, as even Locke sometimes is forced to do. By opening the door for unconsciousness to be included in our theories of mind, I argue, we not only allow for complete and coherent explanations of how the mind functions, but we allow for the possibility of defending a rationalist theory of mind. I will have the opportunity to examine the thesis of rationalism, at least as it exists in an historical context, throughout this treatment, as it is the existence of rationalism that motivates Locke to expound his empiricist views in the Essay. I will also have the opportunity to explain some of the rationalist perspective found in Leibniz's theory of mind, as in the final chapter I will examine Leibniz's criticism of Locke's theory. In the end I will argue that Leibniz's theory of mind wins over Locke's as we find that Leibniz is not only able to account for a wider range of experiences than Locke, but because by virtue of allowing for unconsciousness, Leibniz is able to provide a more coherent view of how the mind functions

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