Mixed strategies and ratifiability in causal decision theory

Erkenntnis 24 (1):25 - 36 (1986)
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10.1007/bf00183199

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William L. Harper
University of Western Ontario

Citations of this work

Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Why Be Random?Thomas Icard - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):111-139.
Determinism, Counterfactuals, and Decision.Alexander Sandgren & Timothy Luke Williamson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):286-302.

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References found in this work

Causal decision theory.David Lewis - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.
Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility.Allan Gibbard & William L. Harper - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. D. Reidel. pp. 125-162.
Pragmatics and Empiricism.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (4):514-516.
Causal decision theory.Brian Skyrms - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (11):695-711.

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