Knowledge, reasons, and causes

Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):841-855 (1970)
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Abstract

An attempt to analyse what it is for belief to be based on reasons becomes involved with questions about the goodness of reasons and the gettier examples. intuitions about knowledge and the "gettier effect" can be used to decide when reasoning has occurred and what reasoning there has been. explanation by reasons is not deterministic

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0022362X

DOI

10.2307/2024037

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Citations of this work

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