The Role of Emotions in Moral Psychology

The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:159-167 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Both indignation, and sometimes shame, can be considered moral emotions because whoever feels them needs a sense of moral values and distinctions, and a grasp of what is correct and incorrect, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable. However, there are differences in the moral aspects associated with each. Shame is related to self-respect and, sometimes, for this to be upheld, something moral is considered necessary. But shame, unlike indignation, is not moral in the sense of being other-regarding. The person who becomes indignant acknowledges the violations of the rights of others and their suffering. The focus here will be on explicating shame and indignation as emotions that require concepts, beliefs and desires related to morality.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-03-18

Downloads
59 (#273,450)

6 months
9 (#315,924)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Olbeth Hansberg
National Autonomous University of Mexico

Citations of this work

Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references