Abstract

In this thesis, I present a theory of happiness that entails humans' optimally utilizing two of their higher-order rational faculties. The first rational faculty that I claim humans must possess in order to be 'happy' is that of 'Agency.' A person possesses Agency when she is able to translate her avowed second-order desires into action. In other words, this person is capable of acting in accordance with those first-order desires that she has decided she wants to act upon. Such a person has a free will, which I understand in Harry Frankfurt's sense of the term. ;Agency, however, does not go far enough in delimiting the rational control that we want for humans for while, as Agents, we may act in accordance with our second-order desires and identifications, we may be irrational, self-deceived and/or compelled with regard to our second-order desires and identifications. For this reason, I introduce the concept of authenticity---a third-order notion meant to safeguard the rationality of the identifications we possess. ;The theory of authenticity that I offer has three parts and combines elements from other theories covered in the thesis. First, it precludes coerced or compelled identifications from counting as authentic. Second, it encompasses a list of rational criteria with which to assess one's identifications. This list includes constitutive principles of "cognitive" rationality as well as pragmatic and anti-compulsion constraints. And third, the theory includes a kind of essentialist-type component, namely, a list of "goods" which we assume it is rational for all humans to desire and pursue. ;My claim is that given Sartrean bad faith, Marxist false consciousness and the degree to which our mental faculties may be bypassed in the formation and adoption of identifications, we have little reason to trust our judgments concerning which of our identifications best represent and best serve us. Striving both to tame our first-order desires and control our wills and to rationally assess and thereby more authentically possess our identifications is what the normative conception of happiness that I am submitting entails