Abstract

This thesis presents a problem for the foundations of quantum mechanics. It arises from the way that theory describes the composition of larger systems in terms of smaller ones, and renders untenable a wide range of interpretations of quantum mechanics. That quantum mechanics is difficult to interpret is old news, given the well-known Measurement Problem. But the problem I raise is quite different, and in important respects more fundamental. In brief: The physical world exhibits mereological structure: physical objects have parts, which in turn have parts, and so on. A natural way to try to represent this structure is by means of a particle theory, according to which the physical world consists entirely enduring physical objects which themselves have no proper parts, but aggregates of which are, or compose, all physical objects. Elementary, non-relativistic quantum mechanics can be cast in this mold--at least, according to the usual expositions of that theory. But herein lies the problem: the standard attempt to give a systematic particle interpretation to elementary quantum mechanics results in nonsense, thanks to the well-established principle of Permutation Invariance, which constrains the quantum-mechanical description of systems containing identical particles. Specifically, it follows from the most minimal principles of a particle interpretation , together with Permutation Invariance, that systems identical in composition must have the same physical state. In other words, systems which merely have the same numbers of the same types of particles are therefore, at all times, perfect physical duplicates. ;This conclusion is absurd: e.g., it is quite plausible that some of those particles which compose my body make up a system identical in composition to some pepperoni pizza. Yet no part of me is a qualitative physical duplicate of any pepperoni pizza. Perhaps "you are what you eat"--but not in this sense! In what follows I develop the principles needed to explore this problem, contrast it with the Measurement Problem, and consider, finally, how it should influence our judgments of the relative merits of the many extant interpretations of quantum mechanics