Continuities of Pragmatism, Settling Metaphysical Disputes and the Analytic-Continental Divide. Part II

Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 6:109-122 (2018)
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Abstract

The author examines the history of pragmatism and maintains that a thematic continuity runs through the classical pragmatists, neopragmatitsts and contemporary pragmatists. This continuity can be vaguely characterized as an integration of theory and practice, but experience gives theory its content such that action is always guiding the formation of knowledge. There are four implications of this continuity. Pragmatists are centrally concerned with the human relationship to a process-oriented and evolving conception of nature. For pragmatists, our beliefs are regarded not as propositions that map onto a separate and fixed reality, but instead their truth emerges out of the habits beliefs generate. Pragmatism emphasizes an openness to possibility since our access to the world of experience is mediated by a variety of selective interests, intellectual histories, varying linguistic and discursive practices. Pragmatists are deeply concerned with the social and political problems that confront us on a daily basis. The author also examines the manner in which James understands the term “metaphysics” given that pragmatism is a method for settling “metaphysical disputes.” Jamesian existential pluralism implies to maximize all possibilities that can satisfy everyone as much as possible without impeding and harming another's capacity to experience a rich and novel world. The author analyzes Todd May’s approach to the analytic-continental divide and concludes that if settlement embraces James’s thick conception of experience, then the resulting ontological pluralism is the best settlement possible, and this commitment to pluralism requires dissolving the exclusionary practices the analytic-continental divide suggests philosophically.

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J. Edward Hackett
Southern University

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References found in this work

Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking.William James - 2014 - Gorham, ME: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Eric C. Sheffield.
The Will to Believe: And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.William James - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Frederick Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers & Ignas K. Skrupskelis.
The Will to believe and other Essays in popular philosophy.William James - 1899 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 47:223-228.
Essays in Radical Empiricism.B. H. Bode, William James & R. B. Perry - 1912 - Philosophical Review 21 (6):704.

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