Abstract

While appeals both to nature and to sceptical tendencies are widely acknowledged as determining factors in Hume's thought, there is considerable divergence of opinion regarding the degree of importance that Hume attaches to each notion. In an attempt to resolve this traditional controversy, this dissertation explores the meaning of Hume's philosophy as a whole in the light of its naturalistic and sceptical character. ;Instead of maintaining their opposition, the argument of the dissertation is that these two sides are complementary--with nature both originating and, afterwards, mitigating the scepticism and scepticism in its turn both reinforcing and subsequently mitigating the naturalism in Hume's thinking. Their symbiotic relationship thus appears as the unifying element of the Humean philosophy. ;The first chapter addresses the problem of the unity of the three parts of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. Hume's references to nature and scepticism in his treatment of epistemological and moral problems are singled out and discriminated. ;The second chapter is devised as an interval in which the scholarly response to the problem of a unity to Hume's philosophy is examined in detail. What is typical of that response is a tendency to locate the unity in the scepticism or the naturalism of Hume's epistemological or moral conclusions. As a result of the examination of the views of leading scholars of Hume's thought, our findings can be set against a horizon within which his philosophy is traditionally interpreted. Focus then turns to the meaning and significance of scepticism and naturalism for ethics and epistemology in Hume's mature philosophy. The third chapter is devoted to An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, and the fourth to An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. In these chapters the dissertation's definitive view of Hume's solution to the philosophical problems of knowledge and morality is shaped. The thesis is advanced and defended that a dynamic relation obtains between Hume's notion of nature and his scepticism. Finally, in the conclusion this view is weighed against the preliminary findings of the Treatise and contrasted with the leading traditions of scholarly interpretation of Hume's philosophy as a whole