Abstract

The present paper is about three concepts which are crucially involved in Gaṅgeśa's interpretation of a Mīmāṃsā argument against the well-known design inference of the existence of God in Nyāya, namely the concepts “cognition” (jñāna), “certitude” (niścaya) and “doubt” (saṃśaya). According to Maheśa Chandra, the author of the Navya-Nyāya manual Brief Notes on the Modern Nyāya System of Philosophy and its Technical Terms, certitude and doubt are the two varieties of cognition. He illustrates the verbal expression of certitudes by means of declaratives and the verbal expression of doubts by means of interrogatives (functioning as polar or alternative questions). He notes also that different credence levels might be associated with the alternatives involved in a speaker’s doubt. A biassed question in the form of a tag interrogative might be an appropriate way to express such a doubt. In Western logic the idea to treat declaratives and interrogatives on a par, which is anticipated by the Navya-Naiyāyikas' use of the unifying concept of “cognition”, goes back to Frege’s distinction between the semantic content (the “thought”) of a sentence and its force and it was recently elaborated by Ciardelli, Farkas, Groenendijk, Roelofsen et al., the founders of a new branch in logic called “inquisitive logic”. In the present paper we will discuss Maheśa Chandra's succinct exposition of the Navya-Naiyāyikas' innovative approach from the perspective of this type of logic. As an offshoot of our analysis we will try to elucidate Gaṅgeśa's apologetic concerns about the well-known design inference of the existence of God in Nyāya and its liability to be vitiated by a dubious upādhi.