Consistent preferences, conflicting reasons, and rational evaluations

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e229 (2022)
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Abstract

Bermúdez's arguments in favour of the rationality of quasi-cyclical preferences conflate reasons, desires, emotions, and responses with genuine preferences. Rational preference formation requires that the decision-makers not only identify reasons, but also weigh them in a coherent way.

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10.1017/s0140525x22000978

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Francesco Guala
Università degli Studi di Milano

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What Preferences Really Are.Erik Angner - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (4):660-681.

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