O indukcji niezupełnej w matematyce

Roczniki Filozoficzne 53 (2):47-72 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The subject of this article is the role of inductive reasoning (in the meaning of induction by incomplete enumeration) in the methodology of mathematics. The following types of induction have been distinguished: I 1) induction which causes formulation of axioms of different mathematical theories; I 2) enumerative induction which causes formulation of theorems on the basis of a finite number of cases; I 3) induction concerning the range of application of mathematical symbols; I 4) induction generalising the properties of finite sets to the infinite case; I 5) induction pointing to analogies between problems belonging to different domains of mathematics. Inductive reasoning should not be put against the creativity of scientists, as induction is often an important, though not always conscious part of our cognition. The concept of notional metaphor can be useful for explaining the nature of inductive reasoning. With this concept, a general scheme of inductive reasoning has been proposed, which, in the opinion of the authors, is more adequate for presenting the nature of induction than traditional approaches

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (4):647-670.
Some problems of counter‐inductive policy as opposed to inductive.Audun Öfsti - 1962 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 5 (1-4):267-283.
Induction and reasoning to the best explanation.Richard A. Fumerton - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):589-600.
The place of induction in science.Mario Bunge - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):262-270.
There Are No Universal Rules for Induction.John D. Norton - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (5):765-777.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-05-27

Downloads
30 (#532,397)

6 months
8 (#359,856)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references