Does Freudian theory resolve "the paradoxes of irrationality"?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):129-143 (2001)
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Abstract

In this paper, I criticize the claim made by Donald Davidson, among others, that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory provides “a conceptual framework within which to describe and understand irrationality.” Further, I defend my epistemological strictures on the explanatory and therapeutic foundations of the psychoanalytic enterprise against the efforts of Davidson, Marcia Cavell, Thomas Nagel, et al., to undermine them

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Author's Profile

Adolf Grunbaum
Last affiliation: University of Pittsburgh

References found in this work

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique.Adolf Grünbaum - 1984 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique.Adolf Grünbaum - 1984 - Berkeley: University of California Press.
The mind and its depths.Richard Wollheim - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Real Self-Deception.Alfred R. Mele - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):91-102.

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