Comparing the long-term evolution of ``cognitive invariances'' in physics with a dynamics in states of consciousness

Foundations of Science 6 (4):255-272 (2001)
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Abstract

It is shown that the evolution of physics canin several regards be described by elements of``regression'', i.e., that within a certaintradition of ideas one begins with theconstruction of most ``plausible'' statements(axioms) at hand, and then ``works onselfbackwards'' with respect to developmental terms.As a consequence of this strategy, the furtherwork proceeds along such a ``regressive'' path,the more one arrives at concepts andrelationships which are unexpected or evencounter-intuitive in terms of our everydayexperiences. However, a comparable phenomenology is wellknown from studies on states of consciousness.In particular, the evolutionary logic of theconstructions of major ``cognitive invariances''in physics, which is in part due to everincreasing rates of data processing, ismirrored in a logic of states of consciousnesswhich deviate from a ``normal'' state of dailyroutine along increasing levels of centralnervous arousal. Examples are given from the evolution ofphysics, and future perspectives are brieflyoutlined on the basis thereof.

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Citations of this work

Editorial. The Constructivist Challenge.A. Riegler - 2005 - Constructivist Foundations 1 (1):1--8.

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References found in this work

Genetic epistemology.Jean Piaget - 1970 - New York,: Columbia University Press.
Against Method.P. Feyerabend - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):331-342.
From Being to Becoming.I. Prigogine - 1982 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (3):325-329.

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