Abstract
In the Prolegomena, Kant characterized the position of the Critique of Pure Reason as "formal idealism." Kant's Theory of Form questions whether the enterprise Kant undertook in the Critique can be successfully carried through, and finds that Kant's self-imposed methodological restrictions generate tensions that he could have resolved only by abandoning his assumption that determinate forms of knowledge are knowable a priori and that an exclusive concern with them is compatible with empirical realism. It is, Pippin argues, Kant's method itself, not any mistakes in following it, that confronts him on every level with the alternatives of yielding to constructive idealism or granting to the empirical aspects of knowledge an epistemological role he finds unacceptable. By his "transcendental turn" Kant proposed to avoid the substantive assumptions that both empirical psychology and rationalist metaphysics laid at the basis of knowledge. That this is the most fertile idea on the Critique is indicated by its immediate and continuing influence on the course of philosophical thinking. That it involves Kant in obscurities is indicated by the problems his commentators inevitably find in the same areas of his thought. Pippin proposes to show, by an internal critique, that these obscurities are not fortuitous but inherent in Kant's radical formalism.