Counterexamples by Possible Conjunction and the Sufficiency of Premises

Teaching Philosophy 26 (1):57-81 (2003)
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Abstract

Showing that the premises of an argument are not sufficient for (viz., do not entail) a conclusion a conclusion involves citing a counterexample that would show the premises of the argument to be true and the conclusion false. This paper distinguishes counterexamples by analogy (an argument with the same form as argument against which it is advanced but where it is clearly the case that the premises are true and the conclusion is false), counterexamples by possible conjunction (a conjunction of the premises and the negation of the conclusion), and counter-arguments (arguments directed against the truth of the conclusion). After detailing the logical differences between these concepts, the paper describes the pedagogical significance of this distinction and provides an assortment of test exercises for students.

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Claude Gratton
University of Toronto (PhD)

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