The Nature of the Theoretical Life According to Aristotle: Wisdom, Politics and Philosophy
Dissertation, The Catholic University of America (
1998)
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Abstract
This dissertation takes its bearings from the problematic character of Aristotle's account of theoretical activity in Nicomachean Ethics VI and X. According to a literal reading of the text, theoretical activity consists exclusively in demonstrative knowledge of eternal and necessary objects. The study of things human is distinguished from theoretical science by its practical motivation: while practically useful it is theoretically uninteresting. The literal reading, however, is problematic: The exclusion of politics from theoretical science conflicts with various remarks Aristotle makes indicating that the study of the human things is, at least in part, theoretically motivated. Secondly, examples of strictly demonstrative knowledge of eternal and necessary beings are not found in the Aristotelian corpus. Aristotle's account of theoria, then, invites further inquiry. Does theoria include the study of the human things? If so, what is its place in Aristotle's inquiry into nature as a whole? In answer to these questions, we argue that the study of the human things is not only theoretically interesting, but that it plays a pivotal role in Aristotle's inquiry into nature as a whole. ;After discussing some of the relevant literature in Chapters One and Two, in Chapter Three we examine Aristotle's account of politics and wisdom in the Nicomachean Ethics. We show that politics is presented as a rival to wisdom as the highest intellectual virtue. We conclude with an interpretive hypothesis which is pursued further in Chapter Four: the highest intellectual virtue must combine the features of both politics and wisdom. Although the highest intellectual virtue entails a concern for the divine, the inquiry into the divine is an extension of the inquiry into the human. ;In Chapter Four we turn to the Metaphysics, especially the account of the divine in Metaphysics XII. We argue that the description of the nature of the divine, and its relation to the cosmos, is based upon an understanding of the human things. Further, the proof for the existence of the divine via the motions of the celestial bodies is inconclusive and in need of being supplemented by an argument based upon an understanding of human things.