Abstract

"The Notion of the concrete General in Plato and Aristotle – Questioning formal logical Ontologies" - The problem of the concrete general notion is equivalent to enquiring about the unity of the general and the singular. Since Plato, this question - which is commonly referred to as the problem of methexis – is one of the most fundamental problems which philosophy is engaged in. This article pursues two goals: Firstly, it aims to provide a brief systematical account on the origin and the solution of this problem with regards to Plato and Aristotle. In doing so, Plato’s solution of the problem of methexis, in the dialectic of his late period, is contrasted with Aristotle’s concept of substance. In this regard the question arises whether Aristotle’s thinking of the problem of methexis has exceeded his teachers achievements in the field of fundamental philosophy or not. Is Aristotle not ultimately avoiding the dialectic, which is contained in the concept of substance – for reasons of formal logic? This point, secondly, shall question the currently prevailing implicitness of the presupposed autarky of formal logic. For it is the very problem of logical justification of the concept of substance in Aristotle which raises this issue: Can the notion of the concrete general be conceivable at all under the precondition that formal logical axioms are also ontologically relevant?