Social insecurity and the no-avail thesis: Insights from philosophy and economic history on consumerist behavior

Ethics, Place and Environment 13 (1):15 – 18 (2010)
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Abstract

Chrisoula Andreou argues that the predominant factor in the exalted and worldly views of human thriving involves a psychological measure of relative deprivation or advantage in relation to social competitors. This is the 'no avail' thesis: promoting self-sacrifice for the sake of conservation, in-and-of-itself, will remain ineffective as environmental policy. However, Andreou sets aside, to some extent, the applicability of philosophical discourse on happiness and human thriving, which is where this commentary is directed. Specifically, Aristotle's insights on social prestige (exousia) being attained through philanthropy is discussed as a counter-narrative to present day materialist culture. For Aristotle, the Hellenic mentality was not to be of exclusionary competition but rather strengthening the community through competitive social power aimed at mutually enriching philia. This model provides a provocative case-study for insight on redirecting competitive human nature toward other ends. Additional supporting analysis is also provided on the emergence of the modern market economy using the works of economic historian Karl Polanyi

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