A reinstatement, in response to Gillies, of Redhead's argument in support of induction

Philosophy of Science 54 (3):470-472 (1987)
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Citations of this work

Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.
Bayes' theorem.James Joyce - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaconfirmation.Denis Zwirn & Herv� P. Zwirn - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (3):195-228.
Partly deductive support in the Popper-Miller argument.Burke Townsend - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496.

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References found in this work

In defense of the Popper-Miller argument.Donald Gillies - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):110-113.
Corroboration, explanation, evolving probability, simplicity and a sharpened razor.I. J. Good - 1968 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):123-143.
On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.

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