Abstract

In Chapter V my own position is presented. It is a modified version of Putnam's theory of reference, incorporating an extension of Field's notion of 'partial denotation' and another notion I introduce called 'partial truth'. The use of these notions is defended and illustrated by comparing the reference of Dalton's term 'element' with the reference of Soddy's terms 'element' and 'isotope', and comparing the truth of Prout's hypothesis that the atomic weight of every element is an integral multiple of the atomic weight of hydrogen with the truth of Soddy's version of Prout's hypothesis. Through this example I show that the position I take with regard to questions and posed above is preferable to the positions considered in the previous chapters. In particular, I show that my position constitutes a reasonable middle ground between the main alternatives represented by Kuhn's position on the one side and Putnam's on the other. ;The two main questions I examine in this dissertation are: Do scientific terms undergo a reference change when a major change in the theory occurs? and If such a reference change occurs can we compare the reference of such terms across the theory change and can we compare the truth of statements using those terms across the theory change ? The position I defend is that a certain type of reference change may occur, and that for these cases there is a relatively clear way of comparing the reference across the theory change and the truth of statements using these terms across the theory change. ;Kuhn's position with regard to questions and is considered and criticized in Chapter I, and the same is done with Carnap's position in Chapter II. In Chapters III and IV, Putnam's and Kripke's theory of reference is described, and those aspects of it related to questions and are critically examined