Abstract

This essay deals critically with Nietzsche’s anthropological typology of the “free spirit par excellence”, “we spirits”, persons endowed with positive as against negative powers, and the ideal of the Übermensch. From this presentation, which actually amounts to a concise summary of my various publications on Nietzsche, I draw two conclusions: The first, and quite surprising one, is that it was not Nietzsche’s ideal of the Übermensch that was the pinnacle of his anthropological philosophy but the even more ideal type of the “free spirit par excellence”. The second, and less surprising, conclusion asserts that a society consisting of such “free spirits” is impossible. This finding will be highlighted by contrasting the Übermenschen, who, according to Nietzsche, need society as a sine qua non for their cultivation, with free spirits par excellence, who, by definition, are free from any need of a society. We will see, however, that on Nietzsche’s terms the ideal of the Übermensch is also not viable in society. Hence this paper points to an inherent flaw in Nietzsche’s existential philosophy -- the non-viability of its most sublime ideals. Nonetheless, one has to speculate about Nietzsche’s reasons for introducing the ideal of the free spirit par excellence -- an ideal that he himself thought to be existentially impractical