Argumentation and social epistemology

Journal of Philosophy 91 (1):27-49 (1994)
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Abstract

What is a good argument? That depends on what is meant by 'argument'. In formal logic, an argument is a set of sentences or propositions, one designated as conclusion and the remainder as premises. On this conception of argument, there are two kinds of goodness. An argument is good in a weak sense if the conclusion either follows deductively from the premises or receives strong evidential support from them. An argument is good in a strong sense if, in addition to this, it has only true premises. Thus, in the strong sense, the paradigm of a good argument is a sound argument.

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Alvin Goldman
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

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