Epistemologia różnicy zdań

Filo-Sofija 14 (27):129-140 (2014)
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Abstract

This article presents the question of the epistemology of disagreement, which can be discussed from two main points of view of conciliationism and of steadfastness. David Christensen and Thomas Kelly are chosen as the representatives. The main problem raised in the article is an epistemic peerhood. The paper aims to prove that it is not possible to identify two philosophers even specialized in the same discipline as peers in the strict sense. They can be treated as peers to a certain extent only, and therefore their opinions cannot be treated as thoroughly equal. Accordingly, the article makes a point that the total evidence view seems to be the best solution in the epistemology of disagreement.

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Celina Głogowska
Uniwersytet Szczeciński

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