In Erna Banić-Pajnić, Bruno Ćurko, Mihaela Girardi-Karšulin & Ivica Martinović (eds.),
Juraj Dragišić: život i djela. Zagreb: Institute of Philosophy. pp. 51-78 (
2016)
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Abstract
It is shown, first, that Georgius Benignus [Juraj Dragišić, ca 1445-1520] at the end of the 15th century almost fully disposed with the theory of the fourth syllogistic figure. Prantl's view on Benignus' logic is critically examined. Besides, Benignus' doctrines on the supposition of terms and logical consequences are examined with respect to his two versions of logic (1488/1489 and 1519) and to the main influences (e.g., Strodus, Paulus Venetus, Ferebrich, Paulus Pergolensis). A reduction of the rules of consequences of Benignus' logic 1488/1489 to the rules of logic 1519 is reconstructed. Benignus rejects the reasoning ex impossible quodlibet and e quolibet necessarium in what he defines as material consequences.