Remarks on collective belief

In Frederick F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology: The Social Dimensions of Knowledge. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 235-56 (1994)
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Abstract

The author develops and elaborates on her account of collective belief, something standardly referred to, in her view, when we speak of what we believe. This paper focuses on a special response hearers may experience in the context of expressions of belief, a response that may issue in offended rebukes to the speaker. It is argued that this response would be appropriate if both speakers and hearers were parties to what the authors calls a joint commitment to believe a certain proposition as a body. This joint commitment puts speakers under an obligation to refrain from speaking in certain ways, and gives hearers a correlative right to such refraining, and hence a basis for offended rebukes.

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Margaret Gilbert
University of California, Irvine

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