Abstract

This thesis attempts to provide an explicit and systematic defence of physicalism--the doctrine that all phenomena are physical or composed of physical phenomena. I argue that there are persuasive general reasons for accepting physicalism , and that physicalists can offer plausible detailed accounts of specific critical issues. I focus on a cluster of such issues in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and epistemology. I emphasize the relations between intentionality, reference and knowledge, and I argue that a satisfactory account in any one of these areas requires a satisfactory account in the others too. Physicalists can provide such an overall account by drawing on the resources of the causal theories which have been developed in each of these areas over the past two decades. I defend this package of anti-positivist views against a variety of important criticisms and show that the mutual support which naturalistic theories give to each other is ultimately crucial in order to meet the deepest philosophical objections to them. In a final chapter I briefly survey the prospects of physicalist accounts in other important areas, with special emphasis on ethics