Abstract

Iris Murdoch tells us: "There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts." I take this essay to be part of the latter movement, part of the move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. Specifically, this essay is a consideration of the simple and obvious fact that liberalism, the political and moral theory which holds that the only ground for limiting the individual's liberty is the prevention of harm to others, is incompatible with paternalism, the political and moral theory which holds that the individual's liberty may be limited not only to prevent harm to others, but also to prevent harm to self. Unfortunately, this simple and obvious fact has been obscured in recent years by philosophers who have suggested that certain forms of paternalism, those forms for example that seek to preserve and protect the individual's freedom, autonomy or individuality, are not only compatible with liberalism, but indeed countenanced by it. I endeavor, therefore, to make clear what has become opaque: it is precisely the liberal commitment to freedom, autonomy and individuality, with its emphasis on thinking and judging for oneself, that renders paternalism of whatever kind impermissible from the liberal point of view