The Activity of Happiness In Aristotle’s Ethics
Abstract
One group of commentators takes book 10 as determinative and thus tortures the text in book 1 to say the same thing. This position is described as intellectualist or exclusivist and produces certain puzzles in reading Aristotle’s ethical theory. These puzzles are not benign since the privileged position given wisdom in book 10 seems at odds with the discussion of virtue in book 1 and its development in the Nicomachean Ethics as a whole. Indeed, Aristotle appears inconsistent or even contradictory, recommending in these two brief chapters of book 10 a life devoted to contemplation that only grudgingly allows for the necessity of the practical life discussed in such detail in the rest of his ethical works. If this is the case, under what conditions are we expected to forgo contemplation to engage in the various activities of the moral virtues? Since no conditions are spelled out in the text, the range of speculation is confused and ways around the apparent inconsistencies complex.