Personal Identity
Dissertation, University of Oxford (United Kingdom) (
1988)
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Abstract
Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis I argue that we ought to accept some version of the Analysis view--the view that the identity of a person over time can be analysed in terms of physical and/or psychological continuities. I also argue that there is no sense in which we ought to be ontological reductionists about persons--a person is an essentially embodied, irreducible, entity whose identity over time is analysable in terms of physical and psychological continuities. ;I argue that any plausible theory of personal identity over time is a best-candidate theory, which implies that the identity of a person over time can be extrinsically determined. Some philosophers find this consequence absurd; but I claim that they have no good reason to. I also show how reference to the extrinsicness of identity features in a powerful argument for Derek Parfit's thesis that identity is not "what matters". Finally, I argue that there are plausible counter-examples to all versions of the Physical and Psychological Criteria of personal identity, and that we ought to accept a version of the Mixed Criterion which acknowledges the importance of both sorts of continuity, but which assigns greater weight to the relation of psychological continuity