El bien como objeto perceptivo de las pasiones en la epistemología moral de Aristóteles

Pensamiento. Revista de Investigación E Información Filosófica 73 (275):45 (2017)
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Diego S. Garrocho Salcedo
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

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