Epidemiological Models and Epistemic Perspectives: How Scientific Pluralism may be Misconstrued

Foundations of Science:1-21 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In a scenario characterized by unpredictable developments, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, epidemiological models have played a leading part, having been especially widely deployed for forecasting purposes. In this paper, two real-world examples of modeling are examined in support of the proposition that science can convey inconsistent as well as genuinely perspectival representations of the world. Reciprocally inconsistent outcomes are grounded on incompatible assumptions, whereas perspectival outcomes are grounded on compatible assumptions and illuminate different aspects of the same object of interest. In both cases, models should be viewed as expressions of specific assumptions and unconstrained choices on the part of those designing them. The coexistence of a variety of models reflects a primary feature of science, namely its pluralism. It is herein proposed that recent over-exposure to science’s inner workings and disputes such as those pertaining to models, may have led the public to perceive pluralism as a flaw—or more specifically, as disunity or fragmentation, which in turn may have been interpreted as a sign of unreliability. In conclusion, given the inescapability of pluralism, suggestions are offered as to how to counteract distorted perceptions of science, and thereby enhance scientific literacy.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,227

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Stance Pluralism, Scientology and the Problem of Relativism.Ragnar van der Merwe - forthcoming - Foundations of Science: DOI: 10.1007/s10699-022-09882-w.
The Concept of Real and Ideal Types.Dmitrii P. Gorskii - 1987 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 26 (3):26-42.
Model Pluralism.Walter Veit - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (2):91-114.
Forms of Causal Explanation.Erik Weber, Jeroen Van Bouwel & Robrecht Vanderbeeken - 2005 - Foundations of Science 10 (4):437-454.
Towards a theory of mathematical argument.Ian J. Dove - 2013 - In Andrew Aberdein & Ian J. Dove (eds.), Foundations of Science. Springer. pp. 291--308.
Imprecise Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Namjoong Kim - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (2):755-781.
On the Association for Foundations of Science, Language and Cognition, AFOS.[author unknown] - 2004 - Foundations of Science 2 (1):197-198.
Rethinking the social sciences? A point of view.Luk van Langenhove - 2000 - Foundations of Science 5 (1):103-118.
Call for Projects of Topic Issues.[author unknown] - 2004 - Foundations of Science 2 (2):400-400.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-11-17

Downloads
11 (#1,142,538)

6 months
9 (#317,143)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Models in Science (2nd edition).Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2021 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Contrastive causation.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):327-358.
Integrative pluralism.Sandra D. Mitchell - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):55-70.

View all 16 references / Add more references