How thirst compels: An aggregation model of sensory motivation

Mind and Language 38 (1):141-155 (2021)
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Abstract

Many sensory states motivate. I offer an account of how such states compel intentional action. I focus on thirst as it is relatively simple in physiological and behavioral terms, it carries little theoretical baggage, and the motivational story for thirst seems likely to generalize. I argue that thirst motivates using a variety of flexible strategies, and that no single explanatory mechanism fully captures its motivational force. The resulting view, the aggregation model of sensory motivation, offers the most plausible account of how sensory states motivate.

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Matthew Fulkerson
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

Hunger, Homeostasis, and Desire.Mohan Matthen - 2023 - Mind and Language 40:1–18.
What Does Pleasure Want?Uku Tooming - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-17.

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References found in this work

What makes pains unpleasant?David Bain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):69-89.
Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.
An Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (10):517-532.
If it itches, scratch!Richard J. Hall - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.

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