Abstract

The central questions of this essay are: Does Wittgenstein hold a theory of names to rival the descriptivism associated with Strawson and Searle, or the causal theory associated with Kripke and Donnellan? Is he interested in offering a philosophical account, or explanation, of a name names an object? And if not, do his remarks on proper names contain a criticism of contemporary approaches to thinking about how an object is named? ;Chapter One shows that the variety and quality of most interpretations of Wittgenstein on proper names justify a more thorough examination of his view of naming. ;Chapter Two identifies in Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language those general themes that illuminate his remarks on proper names, with special attention to the oft-cited PI 79, and its immediate context. The most important interpretive hypothesis is that, for Wittgenstein, practice is the bedrock of language. That people simply use language in the ways described in Wittgenstein's language-games, without thoughts, images, concepts, rules, translations, or other supporting devices, is a fact of basic and fundamental importance for thinking clearly about language. Thinking clearly about naming involves seeing name uses as naming practices. ;Chapter Three contrasts the implications, for the problem of a philosophical explanation of naming, of Wittgenstein's notion of a naming practice and contemporary statements of how the problem is conceived. The implication is that the issue addressed by contemporary theorists, the question they ask, is misconceived. ;The last two chapters bring the Wittgensteinian criticism to bear on descriptivism and the causal theory . The aim is to show the force of the notion of naming practices, but some independent criticisms are also offered. The metatheoretical critical force of the notion of naming practices is made explicit in Chapter Five. The conclusions are that Wittgenstein has no theory of names as those theories are currently understood, and that his remarks offer very general criticisms of the questions motivating at least two contemporary ways of thinking about names