Abstract

Although Mr. Schrader states that "it is beyond the scope of [his] paper to examine Kant's argument in the Analytic that our empirical knowledge rests upon a priori knowledge of space and time," he does offer a hint as to how he would go about this: "[Kant] seeks to show that the categories are necessary in order to cognize events in one space and one time, and that all empirical judgments rest upon the assumption that space and time are unitary." This is undeniably the foundation of Kant's theory of time. It shows, however, a bias for the special manner of the objective deduction, where emphasis falls on the unity of consciousness as the basic premiss, instead of on the conditions of representations in general, which is how the basic premiss is stated in the subjective deduction in the first edition. The two are equivalent, as Kant insists, but the formulation in the subjective deduction wears a bolder, more radical countenance, since it stresses what is less explicit in the objective deduction, that all the Analytic is derived from nothing more than the nature of a representation. For most purposes the two transcendental deductions are interchangeable, but for the theory of time we turn most profitably to that deduction which dwells more meticulously on the earliest stages, and elaborates the most primitive steps of the deduction of the categories. Accordingly we will now examine the subjective deduction in the first edition.