Information, veridicality, and inferential knowledge

American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):61-75 (2017)
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Abstract

Is information always true? According to some authors, including Dretske, Grice, Barwise, and recently, Floridi, who has defended the Veridicality Thesis, the answer is positive. For, on Floridi’s view, there is an intimate relation between information and knowledge, which is always true. It is argued in this article that information used in inferential knowledge can, nevertheless, be false, thereby showing that the Veridicality Thesis is false.

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Author Profiles

Nir Fresco
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Patrick McGivern
University of Wollongong

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