Abstract

Two extremely important tasks in the epistemology of a priori knowledge occupy me in this dissertation. First, the most urgent: to provide an explicit characterization of the notion of "a priori knowledge" and related epistemological notions. I offer characterizations of the notions of "a priori knowledge", "warrant" and "method", and proceed to evaluate the suggestions analyzing whether the truths we usually regard as a priori come out as a priori on my account. Second, I come up with a plausible notion of infallibility which is compatible with the fact that we are fallible knowers and offer an answer to the question whether infallibility, properly understood, has a place only in the realm of a priori knowledge. The question to ask concerning a method is whether if I execute it correctly and then apprehend the belief I ought to form according to the result, there is any residual possibility of that belief's being mistaken. I conclude that it does seem that no a posteriori method is absolutely infallible and, it is certainly the case that not all a priori methods are infallible. However, a priori truths are generally known by the correct prosecution of infallible methods